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Bujol v. Entergy and The Good Samaritan Doctrine:
Workers' Compensation and Safety Regulations,
Who Needs Them?
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great
cases are called great, not by reason of their real
importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because ofsome accident of immediate overwhelming
interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the
judgment.'
When a life-changing injury occurs or a life is tragically lost in an
employment context, one cannot help but feel sympathy for the
injured worker or his survivors for the consequences of the fateful
workplace accident. Many times, as a result of such devastation, the
injured employee or his survivors expect to be compensated for their
misfortunes in an amount that far exceeds that offered by the
employer through traditional workers' compensation benefits. So in
a sort of a tribute to the litigiousness of American society, a civil
dispute arises over who is to blame and how justice is to be served.
When this happens, it is essential that such disagreements be resolved
in a forum insulated from the emotions which so easily distort an
individual's sense of the proper judicial remedy. Thus, in the realm
of litigation, it is the court's job to ensure that the law is properly
applied to the facts of the case without undue influence by the
compassionate tendencies of human nature.
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal's decision of Bujol
v. Entergy Services, Incorporated2 involved a workplace accident that
claimed the life of one worker and permanently altered the lives of
two others when a sudden flash fire occurred at an air separation
facility near Plaquemine, Louisiana.3 The injured workers and the
survivors of the deceased were eligible candidates for receiving
workers' compensation benefits under Louisiana's workers'
compensation system, according to which "the employer surrenders
the immunity against liability which he would otherwise enjoy in all
cases in which he was without fault, and, in return, the employee
loses his right to full damages for his injury and accepts instead a
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1. From Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s dissent in N. Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 400, 24 S.Ct. 436, 468 (1904).
2. 833 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002). As this case note went to print,
the Louisiana Supreme Court had just granted writs and the litigants were in the
process of preparing for their oral arguments before the Court.
3. Details of the accident are discussed infra, Section I.
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limited sum by way of compensation."4 But in an attempt to recover
damages above and beyond the benefits provided by the state's
workers' compensation legislation, the Bujol plaintiffs instituted a
third party negligence action against the parent corporation of the
subsidiary facility at which the accident occurred. The plaintiffs
claimed that the parent corporation had assumed a duty to provide for
the safety of the employees at the subsidiary plant, and the alleged
breach of that duty was the cause-in-fact of the injuries sustained by
the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs' theory of recovery centered on the Good
Samaritan doctrine, which stems from the principle established in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965).' The doctrine has
existed for centuries,6 and has traditionally been used to impose
liability upon an actor who has failed to exercise reasonable care
when it undertook to perform a duty owed to a third party.7 But only
a few decades ago, the Good Samaritan doctrine began to evolve into
a lucrative tool for plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on parent
corporations for workplace accidents occurring at their subsidiary
facilities. By using the Good Samaritan doctrine in the context of a
corporate parent/subsidiary relationship, many plaintiffs have
prospered in their attempts to "shift the blame from the party
responsible for the harm to the entity with the healthiest balance
sheet."' In addition to enjoying the benefits of evading the exclusive
remedy provisions of most state's workers' compensation statutes,
employees of subsidiary corporations have also successfully
employed the Good Samaritan doctrine "in their individual efforts to
establish the liability of a parent corporate shareholder as an
alternative to piercing the corporate veil."9 Overall, the Good
4. H. Alston Johnson III, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 361, in
14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (4th ed. 2002).
5. The Restatement, as defined by Black's Law Dictionary 1314 (7t' ed.
1999), is "[o]ne of several influential treatises, published by the American Law
Institute, describing the law in a given area and guiding its development." For a
detailed discussion of the Good Samaritan doctrine see Section II, infra.
6. See Annette T. Crawley, Note, Environmental Auditing and the "Good
Samaritan " Doctrine: Implications for Parent Corporations, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 223,
234 (1993) ("Recognition of the Good Samaritan doctrine as an exception to the
traditional restriction of liability traces its origin to the seminal eighteenth century
case of Coggs v. Bernard," 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B. 1703), (citations omitted)).
7. Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A (1965). For full text of§324Asee
Section II, infra.
8. Crawley, supra note 6, at 264-65.
9. Andrew J. Natale, Comment, Expansion of Parent Corporate Liability
Through the Good Samaritan Doctrine - A Parent Corporation's Duty to Provide
a Safe Workplace for Employees of its Subsidiary, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 717, 729
(1988) (citations omitted). For a discussion of the consequences of using the Good
Samaritan doctrine as an alternative to piercing the corporate veil see Section IV,
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Samaritan doctrine has the potential to provide plaintiffs who are
injured on the job with ample opportunity to win the "lawsuit
lottery."'"
Bujol v. Entergy is by no means a great case, but it is every bit a
hard case. The First Circuit was faced with the difficult task of
determining whether the plaintiffs had met their burden of
demonstrating that the circumstances justified imposing liability on
the parent corporation for the workplace accident that occurred at its
subsidiary plant. If successful, the court knew that the plaintiffs stood
to recover a tremendous compensatory award for the losses they
suffered, but, if not, the victims of the devastating accident would be
left with only the benefits that they were entitled to receive via
worker's compensation. But regardless of whether Bujol is an
illustration of a court's judgment being distorted by an "immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings," the court
appears to have misapplied the law to the facts, resulting in a windfall
for the plaintiffs and the possible introduction of some very "bad
law" into our Louisiana jurisprudence.
The negative effects that the Bujol opinion stands to create are
particularly troublesome. This note seeks to explain what went
wrong in the Bujol decision, and what must be done to address the
problems that Bujol will create. Part I introduces the facts that gave
rise to the First Circuit's decision. Next, Part II analyzes the basic
features of the Good Samaritan doctrine and some of the case law
addressing the doctrine's application in the context of a plaintiffs
claim for imposing tort liability. The majority of the analysis in Part
II focuses on corporate parent/subsidiary relationships. Part IT[ offers
a critical analysis of the First Circuit's application of the Good
Samaritan doctrine in Bujol. Following up in Part IV, the note takes
a brief look at some of the negative implications that acceptance of
the Good Samaritan doctrine in Louisiana jurisprudence will likely
have on multi-tiered corporations and workers alike. Finally, Part V
presents a possible proposal for preventing the danaging
consequences that the doctrine's presence in Louisianajurisprudence
has the potential to create.
I. BUJOL v. ENTERGY
In the early morning of April 6, 1994, the Air Liquide America
Corporation (ALAC) air separation facility located near Plaquemine,
infra.
10. The term "lawsuit lottery" comes from the title of Jeffrey O'Connell's
book, The Lawsuit Lottery: Only the Lawyers Win (1979), in which the author
argues that "[tihe operation of the tort system is akin to a lottery." Id. at 8.
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Louisiana, experienced a significant loss of voltage due to an
electrical disturbance that occurred at the Exxon refinery in Baton
Rouge. As a result of the loss of electricity, "[m]ajor equipment at the
ALAC facility and the Exxon refinery automatically shut down."'"
Shortly thereafter, three workers, involved in the process of restarting
the ALAC facility, were manually closing a large pressure control valve
when a "huge fireball" erupted. 2 Two of the men suffered severe bums
on over 90 percent of their bodies, and the third worker died five days
after the explosion. "3
The injured workers and the survivors of the deceased, in the
second trial'4 arising from the flash fire, brought suit against the
insurers of Air Liquide, S.A. (ALSA), the parent corporation of
ALAC, 5 seeking compensatory and exemplary damages. 6 A
multinational company headquartered in France, ALSA is involved in
manufacturing, storing, handling, and transporting oxygen. The
company employs 27,600 people worldwide and has corporate
facilities operating in some 60 countries, most of which are located in
France, North America, and South America. 7 In 1986, ALSA
purchased Big Three Industries, adding to the ALSA list of subsidiaries
15 plants in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. The purchase included
the Plaquemine plant, renamed ALAC, where the accident occurred.
11. Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 756 So. 2d 388, 395 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999).
12. Id. at 399.
13. Id. at 394.
14. The employees and the survivors of the deceased had previously brought
suit against an electric utility company, among others, alleging that the electrical
disturbance was the ultimate cause of the explosion that occurred at the Plaquemine
plant. After a trial on the merits, the 18th Judicial District Court of Iberville Parish
found that the utility companies involved were 40 percent at fault for the plaintiff's
injuries and awarded the plaintiffs damages totaling $22,728,450.00. However, the
First Circuit Court ofAppeal, in Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 756 So. 2d 388 (La.App.
1st Cir. 1999), reversed the judgment of the district court, finding that the trial
court was manifestly erroneous in holding the electric utility companies liable for
the plaintiff's damages. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and eventually
affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Perkins v. Entergy Corp., 782 So.
2d 606 (2001).
15. ALSA is the "corporate ancestor" of ALAC; one of ALSA's personnel
described the company's ownership structure as "cascading," whereby "ALSA owns
Air Liquide International, S.A., which in turn owns American Air Liquide, Inc.,
which in turn owns AL American Holdings, which in turn owns ALAC." Bujol v.
Entergy Services, Inc., 833 So. 2d 947, 956 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002).
16. ALAC was the direct employer of the injured workers, therefore ALAC was
immune from tort liability. However, the plaintiffs claim of tort liability against
ALSA was not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Louisiana's workers'
compensation statute based on the court's determination that ALSA is not a
stockholder of ALAC, rather it is ALAC's "great-great grandparent." Id. at 965
n.18.
17. Id. at 955.
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At trial, the jury determined that ALSA had assumed a duty to
provide safety services to the employees working at the ALAC plant
under the Good Samaritan doctrine.8 The plaintiffs' claim relied
heavily upon a technical instruction document produced by ALSA
that set the minimum requirements to be met throughout the Air
Liquide Group concerning oxygen pipeline networks. One of the
mandatory requirements set forth in the technical instruction
document, which was determined to be applicable to all ALSA
subsidiaries, was the need for plants to have protective barrier walls
constructed between the gate valve and the handwheel. 20  The
barrier walls were designed to prevent the very types of injuries
suffered by the plaintiffs, but no such walls had been installed at the
ALAC plant. The jury concluded that ALSA had breached its duty
to provide safety to its subsidiaries' employees by failing to ensure
that the mandatory safety requirements, including the construction
of barrier walls, were being enforced. 2 The jury found ALSA to be
80 percent at fault for the accident, and awarded the plaintiffs over
$3,000,000 in compensatory damages and $120,000,000 in
exemplary damages. The trial court entered judgment in
accordance with the jury verdict, and ALSA appealed.
The Good Samaritan doctrine has traditionally been used by
plaintiffs to impose liability on various entities for the voluntary, yet
negligent, care they sought to provide but somewhere in the process
fell short. Within the past few decades, though, the doctrine has
become a popular mechanism for plaintiffs' attorneys to impose
liability in the corporate context. For some plaintiffs hoping to
impose liability upon a parent corporation for injuries sustained by
the plaintiff while working for one of the parent's subsidiaries, the
Good Samaritan doctrine has proven to be a generous contributor to
the plaintiffs cause. Nonetheless, there exist serious differences
regarding the specific ways in which courts have allowed this
doctrine to be used to impose liability in such situations. A review
of some of the instances in which courts have been called upon to
consider the Good Samaritan doctrine's application in the
parent/subsidiary context can provide a better understanding of the
complex issues that the doctrine's presence in such instances has the
tendency to create.
18. Id. at 960. See Section III, infra, for discussion of the Good Samaritan
doctrine.
19. Id. at 961.
20. Id. at 956.
21. Id.
22. The trial court applied Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3, which was
repealed in 1996, to award exemplary damages because the provision was still in
effect at the time of the accident in 1994. Id. at 967, n.19.
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II. THE GOOD SAMARITAN DOCTRINE: APPLICATION AND
ANALYSIS
When an individual voluntarily takes it upon himself or herself to
lend aid to a person in harm's way, there is the inherent notion that he
or she should act in a reasonable manner so as not to place the victim
in a worse position than if no action had been taken. Therefore, when
an "actor fails to exercise reasonable care when it undertakes the
performance of a duty owed to a third party, 2 3 the Good Samaritan
doctrine provides an avenue for injured Victims to hold an actor liable
for the negative consequences that may come about as a result of an
inadequately performed duty. The Good Samaritan doctrine is the
term commonly used to refer to the principle established in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965), which provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect2 his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of
such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to
the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the
third person upon the undertaking.25
At its foundation, the Good Samaritan doctrine requires a
showing, by the plaintiff, that "the defendant specifically has
undertaken to perform the task that he or she is charged with having
performed negligently. 2 6  Once established, the threshold
23. Andrew J. Natale, Comment, Expansion ofParent Corporate Shareholder
Liability Through the Good Samaritan Doctrine - A Parent Corporation's Duty to
Provide a Safe Workplace for Employees of Its Subsidiary, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 717,
729 (1988).
24. Citing the Fifth Circuit opinion of Hill v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
428 F.2d 112, 115 n.5 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1008, 91 S.Ct. 564,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated, "[t]he use of the word 'protect' in the
introductory portion apparently was a typographical error published in the
Restatement and should read 'perform."' Miller v. Bristol-Myers Co., 485 N.W.2d
31 (Wis. 1992).
25. Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A (1965).
26. Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3rd Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
sought to recover damages from the United States for the Coast Guard's allegedly
negligent inspection of a foreign vessel which exploded shortly after the inspection
occurred; the court cited two aspects of the plaintiffs case which convinced it that
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requirement presented in the introductory paragraph of section 324A
is fulfilled, but the plaintiff must then prove that one of the three
situations present in subsection (a), (b), or (c) is met before liability
will be imposed.27
The results of various state and federal court opinions lend
credence to the observation that "[c]ourts continually have struggled
to apply the Good Samaritan doctrine in the context of corporate
responsibility. 2 ' Not only is it often difficult for courts to make an
absolute determination as to whether an entity has assumed a
particular duty, but various policy considerations stand in the way of
making their decisions clear-cut. However, it would be a fallacy to
propose the idea that all decisions involving the Good Samaritan
doctrine in the corporate realm fall into a massive grey area and are
painstakingly difficult to decide. There are instances in which there
is almost no doubt that a duty has been assumed and liability should
be imposed without fear of creating an unjust result or ill-conceived
policy statement. Unfortunately, there is no bright-line test for
determining when the doctrine has been properly applied, and there
may never be one, given the unique characteristics and circumstances
that every case presents.
the proper approach for deciding whether liability should be imposed upon the
government was to apply section 324A: (1)plaintiffs "clearly would benefit from the
Coast Guard's performance of the activities [that were authorized by the Port and
Water Ways Safety Act of 1972]," and (2) for purposes of analysis with respect to
the Good Samaritan doctrine the plaintiffs were undoubtably third persons who
were "foreseeable beneficiar[ies] of the inspection"; held, even though the Coast
Guard's actions under the specific circumstances created a duty to the plaintiffs
under section 324A, the plaintiff's injuries did not result in the Coast Guard's
liability for the explosion because the plaintiffs failed to establish either the
"increased risk" or detrimental reliance subsections of 324A). But see Evans v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 398 F.2d 665, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1968) wherein the court held
that for a plaintiff to establish liability under the Good Samaritan doctrine for a
negligently performed inspection, plaintiff must successfully demonstrate that the
defendant has undertaken to specifically inspect the harm-causing instrument or that
the entire area in which the instrument was located was inspected.
27. See, e.g., Tillmanv. Travelers Indemn. Co., 506 F.2d917, 920-21 (5thCir.
1975). A worker brought suit against his employer's workers' compensation
insurance carrier to recover additional damages as a result of the carrier's alleged
negligence in providing safety services. The court stated that in order to impose
liability under section 324A, the plaintiff must demonstrate that more than an
undertaking and a failure to exercise reasonable care therewith occurred. "For
liability to attach, it must be shown that either (a) the insurer's negligence increased
the risk of harm to the employee; or (b) the insurer undertook to perform a duty
owed by the employer to the employees; or (c) the harm is suffered because of
reliance of the employer or the injured employee upon the undertaking."
28. Annette T. Crawley, Note, Environmental Auditing and the "Good
Samaritan " Doctrine: Implications for Parent Corporations, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 223,
235 (1993) (citations omitted).
2003] NOTES 447
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
A. Section 324A's Main Text: The Threshold Requirement
Some courts have held that when there is no evidence that a
parent corporation has specifically agreed or promised to provide the
type of services referred to in 324A's main text, "the threshold
element is lacking., 29  Thus, further analysis under the Good
Samaritan doctrine is without warrant. In Rick v. RLC Corp., a
Michigan United States District court, Eastern District, was called
upon to "determine the characteristics which must be present to give
rise to a duty 30 in a suit against a parent corporation. The suit was
brought by an employee of the parent corporation's subsidiary who
suffered a herniated disc and nerve root damage when his truck
overturned as a result of the suspension system coming apart from the
bottom of the truck's trailer.3' The plaintiff claimed that the parent
corporation "was negligent in providing management services in
accident prevention and safety to [the plaintiffs employer]. 32
However, the court found these types of services to be inadequate
proof that the parent corporation owed a duty to the plaintiff. Citing
a Michigan Supreme Court case 33 in support of its decision, the court
stated that simply presenting "[e]vidence that benefits were conferred
upon [the subsidiary] or its employees is not sufficient to establish a
duty if [the parent corporation's] conduct was consistent with an
intention primarily to serve its own purposes. 34 Therefore, because
the plaintiff did not prove that the parent corporation agreed or
promised to provide services designed to call to the attention of the
subsidiary or its employees possible safety hazards associated with its
equipment, the plaintiff "failed to create a jury question on whether
the scope and nature of the relationship gave rise to an undertaking
creating a duty on the part of [the parent corporation]."'35
In an opinion by the U. S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, the
court ruled that evidence which demonstrates that a parent
corporation is concerned with safety matters at its subsidiary plant,
and manifests this concern by providing assistance to the subsidiary
29. Rick v. RLC Corp., 535 F. Supp. 39, 47 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
30. Id. at 42.
31. Id. at41.
32. Id. at 41. The management services provided by the parent corporation to
its subsidiary "included negotiation package insurance for [the subsidiary],
reviewing accident reports, and investigating selective accidents." Id. at 46.
33. Smith v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 303 N.W.2d 702 (Mich. 1981)(discussing the use of the term "services" in the Restatement of Torts (Second)
§ 325A (1965), the court referred to the general definition of the word as it appears
in Webster's New International Dictionary and emphasized the notion that service
requires acting to help or benefit another).
34. Rickv. RLC Corp., 535 F. Supp. 39,45 (E.D. Mich 1981).
35. Id. at 47.
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when a request is made by the local management, is, by itself,
insufficient for purposes of establishing that the parent had a duty to
protect the subsidiary's employee according to the standard
established in section 324A.36 Muniz v. National Can Corporation
involved an individual who brought suit against a parent corporation
in an attempt to recover "damages for injuries he sustained allegedly
as a result of continuous exposure to toxic lead fumes while he was
employed" at one of the parent's subsidiary plants." Although
evidence was presented which established that the parent corporation
"provided general safety guidelines ... and ... intended for these
general guidelines to be implemented by local management," the
court held that the parent corporation did not assume a responsibility
for safety at its subsidiary's plant.38 According to the Muniz court,
"[n]either mere concern with nor minimal contact about safety
matters creates a duty to ensure a safe working environment for the
employees of a subsidiary corporation. 3 9 Thus, failure to present
evidence demonstrating "some proof of a positive undertaking"
performed by the parent corporation caused the plaintiff's case to fall
short of establishing the type of duty referred to in the introductory
paragraph of 324A.
In Gaines v. Excel Industries, Incorporated,' the district court for
the Middle District of Tennessee held that the plaintiff's allegations
were sufficient to withstand summary judgment based on the
defendant parent corporation's conduct involving safety inspections
and consultations with its subsidiary plant. The plaintiffs in Gaines
brought suit against the parent corporation of their employer after
they sustained injuries in two separate accidents involving stamp
presses and the connected safety devices.4' One of the parent
corporation's employees had "reviewed safety programs and records,
36. Muniz v. Nat'l Can Corp., 737 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1984).
37. Id. at 147. The parent corporation involved in Muniz owned 80 percent of
the voting stock of its subsidiary; and although the plaintiff's only remedy against
his direct employer (the subsidiary) was for workers' compensation, under Puerto
Rican law, he was permitted to bring the third-party claim against the parent
corporation because of the parent corporation's status as a separate legal entity. See
also Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 836, 100 S. Ct. 71 (1978) ("An injured employee, who is estopped from
bringing a cause of action against a subsidiary-employer, may bring a third-party
claim against the parent corporation, if the parent is a separate legal entity."). Id.
38. Muniz, 737 F.2d at 149.
39. Id. at 148.
40. 667 F. Supp. 569 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
41. Id. at 570. The court acknowledged that under the Workers Compensation
Laws of Tennessee the plaintiff's employer is immune from general tort liability.
However, the court reserved for later proceedings the issue of whether the workers
compensation exclusivity bar extended to parent corporations. Id at 576.
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conducted safety audits, and participated in safety inspection tours"'42
at the subsidiary plant where the injury occurred. In its argument for
summary judgment, the parent corporation argued that
implementation of the company's safety program was to be
administered solely by the local subsidiary. The parent corporation
asserted "that it did not undertake to render services within the
meaning of 324A's main text. '43 The court found this argument to be
unpersuasive. So it proceeded with its analysis according to the
various subsections of 324A, because once the threshold issue of
whether the defendant has "undertak[en] ... to render services to
another . . ." has been decided in the affirmative, it is then
mandatory to examine the subsections before liability will be
imposed.
B. Subsection (a): Increasing the Risk of Harm
Once a court has decided that a defendant's actions fall within the
parameters of the opening text of section 324A, the analysis must not
stop there. Rather, it must then proceed in such a way as to determine
whether the plaintiffs claim successfully incorporates one of the
three alternative subsections. In order to impose liability under
subsection (a) of the Good Samaritan Doctrine, a plaintiff must
establish that the defendant's "failure to exercise reasonable care
increase[d] the risk"' 5 of harm that caused the plaintiffs injuries.
This "increased risk of harm" may come in the form of action or41
inaction on behalf of the parent corporation. When there has been
some change to the working environment 7 brought about by the
parent corporation and the change is alleged to be the source of a
plaintiff's injury, there is good reason to believe that such an instance
falls within the confines of subsection (a). Thus, "[i]f the parent
42. Id. at 572.
43. Gaines v. Excel Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 569,572 n.3 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
44. Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A (1965).
45. Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A(a) (1965).
46. The essence of subsection (a) is that it "requires some change in the
conditions that increases the risk of harm to the plaintiff over the level of risk that
existed before the defendant became involved." Canipe v. Nat'l Loss Control Serv.
Corp., 736 F.2d 1055, 1062 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying §324A as rule of law in
Tennessee), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191 (1985) (citing Stacy v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 484 F.2d 289, 293 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973; Blessing v. U.S., 447 F. Supp. 1160,
1197, n.53 (E.D. Pa. 1978), "A failure to detect a hazardous condition does not by
itself implicate subsection (a).").
47. See Patentas v. U.S., 687 F.2d 707, 717 (3d Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that there had been "some physical change to the environment of some




corporation engages in affirmative misconduct rather than omission
or nonfeasance, a plaintiff may be able to convince a court that the
parent has increased the risk of harm and thus should be liable for its
voluntary undertaking under the Good Samaritan doctrine." '4
The issue becomes a bit more complicated when there is almost
complete inaction by the defendant. The question then becomes,
under what circumstances may a court impose liability for basically
doing nothing at all? For example, if a parent corporation was
deemed to have undertaken to perform services for its subsidiaries,
such as conducting workplace safety inspections, and "conditions [in
the areas which were supposed to be inspected] were deteriorating
[because the workplace area had not been inspected like it should
have],.., inaction could occur in the face of an increasing risk of
harm."49 But would such a situation justify imposing liability on a
parent corporation? Most courts would probably answer in the
affirmative because "[i]naction by a safety inspector might also lull
the person primarily responsible for safety into a sense that minimum
standards were being met, result in less diligent safety monitoring by
the primary actor, and thereby cause an increase in the risk of
harm."50 However, this is not to say that all negligent inspections fall
under the "increased risk of harm" rubric, and as a result, justify
imposing liability on a defendant."
C. Subsection (b): Undertaking to Perform a Duty Owed by
Another
To impose liability under subsection (b), a plaintiff has to prove
that the defendant's breach occurred under circumstances in which
the defendant had "undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other
to a third person ... ."" For example, in parent/subsidiary
relationships, the duty would initially be owed by the subsidiary, but
instead, the parent corporation takes the subsidiary's place in
performing a duty for a third person, which in the context of Bujol is
the employee of the subsidiary. Subsection (b) tends to pose more
48. Annette T. Crawley, Note, Environmental Auditing and the "Good
Samaritan" Doctrine. Implications for Parent Corporations, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 223,
238-39 (1993).
49. Gaines v. Excel Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 569, 572 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
50. Id.
51. See Santillo v. Chanbersburg Eng'g Co., 603 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Pa.
1985) ("It is well-settled that under § 324A negligent inspection does not meet the
requirements of§ 324A(a).") (citing Canipe v. Nat'l Loss Control Serv. Corp., 736
F.2d 1055, 1062 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191,105 S.Ct. 965 (1985);
Patentas, 687 F.2d at 717; Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th
Cir. 1976)).
52. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A(b) (1965).
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problems with respect to judicial interpretation than the other
subsections because courts continue to disagree about its suggested
meaning. Some courts understand subsection (b) to mean that a
defendant must do more than merely supplement its subsidiaries'
safety services to be held liable. For instance, the court, in Heinrich
v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, held that "[l]iability under
section 324A(b) arises in the workplace setting only if the actor's
undertaking was intended to be in lieu of, rather than as a supplement
to, the employer's own duty of care to the employees."53 Conversely,
there are courts that have taken a less restrictive approach to
interpreting subsection (b). These courts have held that "[s]ubsection
(b) comes into play as long as the party who owes the plaintiff a duty
of care has delegated to the defendant any particular part of that
duty."54
D. Subsection (c): Reliance
A defendant is subject to liability under subsection (c) if the
plaintiff relied upon the defendant's assumption of a duty to the third
person's detriment." For some courts, "the subsidiary or the
employee must have relied on the parent corporation's undertaking
and [... ] because of that reliance, they lessened, omitted, neglected,
or otherwise altered their own safety practices and such alteration was
a cause of the employee's injuries. '56 For a concrete illustration,57
suppose the owner of an office building employs a company to
inspect the building's elevators. A worker from the company is sent
to the building, renders a negligent inspection, and as a result, issues
53. 532 F. Supp. 1348, 1355 (D.Md. 1982) (citing Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 525 F.2d at 1207-08; Stacey v. Aetna Cas.& Sur. Co., 484 F.2d 289, 294 (5th
Cir. 1973); Blessing v. U.S., 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1193-95 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
54. Canipe v. Nat'l Loss Serv. Corp., 736 F.2d 1055, 1062-63 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S. Ct. 965 (1985) (citing Davis v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 525 F.2d at 1207-08) (footnote omitted).
55. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A(c) (1965).
56. Miller v. Bristol-Myers Co., 485 N.W. 2d 31, 40 (Wis. 1992). See also
Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1976); Heinrich v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 532 F.Supp. 1348 (D. Md. 1982).
57. The following example comes from illustration 4 of the comments to
Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A (1965), current through July 2002. The
illustration is modeled after Van Winkle v. American Steam-Boiler Ins. Co., 19 A.
472 (N.J. 1890). As further examples in accordance with subsection (c), reliance,
the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965) also cite the
following cases: Gimino v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 14 N.W.2d 536 (Mich. 1944);
Sheridan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 100 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1940); Westinghouse
Elec. Elevator Co. v. Hatcher, 133 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1943); Bollin v. Elevator
Const. & Repair Co., 63 A.2d 19 (Pa. 1949); Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 56 S.E.2d
684 (N.C. 1949).
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a report stating that the elevator is in sufficient working condition.
Shortly thereafter, the elevator's safety mechanism fails to function
properly, which causes the elevator to come crashing down, injuring
one of the building owner's workmen. During the course of an
investigation subsequent to the accident, it is determined that a proper
inspection would have disclosed the injury-causing defect in the
elevator. Thus, according to the principle established in subsection
(c), the elevator inspector's employer is subject to liability to the
injured workman, because the owner of the office building relied
upon the company to successfully complete the task that the inspector
undertook to perform, and that reliance resulted in the harm suffered.
In such.a case, the Good Samaritan doctrine, under subsection (c),
would be properly invoked as authority for imposing liability on the
company that was charged with the duty of inspecting the elevator.
IU. THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN
DOCTRINE
Prior to the First Circuit's Bujol decision, there had been no
"Louisiana cases analyzing the Good Samaritan doctrine in the
context of a corporate parent/subsidiary relationship.""8 Thus, the
lack of Louisiana jurisprudence forced the First Circuit to look
beyond the state's boundaries for guidance. In its search for
direction, the court cited only two cases that had addressed the
pertinent issues presented in Bujol.9 However, only one of the cases,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Bristol-Myers
Company,' demonstrated "striking similarities"' to the instant case.
Miller involved an employee who brought suit against the parent
corporation of her employer for injuries she received when the
flammable chemical she was pouring into a disposal container
ignited.62 The plaintiff alleged "that through its actions, [the parent
corporation had assumed a duty of care to the employees of its
subsidiary] and that such actions had a direct effect in causing the
58. Bujol v. Entergy Services, Inc., 833 So. 2d 947, 960 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2002).
59. The first case, Johnson v. Abbe Eng'g Co., 749 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1984)
was cited only to note that "[s]ection 324A is commonly called the 'Good
Samaritan doctrine."' Id at 1132.
60. 485 N.W.2d 31 (Wis. 1992).
61. Bujol, 833 So. 2d at 960.
62. 485 N.W.2d 31, 33-4 (Wis. 1992). The Miller court also addressed the
issue of whether the defendant parent corporation was immune from liability for
workplace injuries under Wisconsin's state Worker's Compensation Act. The court
held that the parent corporation was not immune from tort liability. Id. at 33.
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injuries [she] sustained., 63  The parent corporation played a
significant role in the process of insuring that its subsidiary's
employees had a safe material preparation room, which was the
location of the accident. For example, personnel from the parent
corporation conducted "unannounced occupational health and safety
audits," offered recommendations for a safe workplace, and had
even consulted an independent safety consultant regarding conditions
at the plant where the accident occurred.65 Given these facts, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the parent corporation had
rendered the type of services to its subsidiary that satisfy the
introductory portion of section 324A.66 However, recognizing that
"[i]iability for the actor arises if the actor failed to exercise reasonable
care in the undertaking and the requirements of subsection (a), (b), or
(c) are met,, 67 the court remanded the case to the circuit court for a
determination of whether the parent corporation's actions met the
requirements of one of 324A's subsections.68
The Louisiana First Circuit began its analysis of ALSA's liability
by noting that negligence cases in Louisiana are typically addressed
by applying the traditional duty/risk analysis.6 The court then
endorsed the plaintiff s theory of recovery using the Good Samaritan
doctrine stating that "[t]he concept of an assumed duty is very firmly
rooted in Louisiana jurisprudence."70 Focus then shifted to the
63. Id. at 34.
64. Id. at 34.
65. Id. at 35.
66. Id. at 40.
67. Id. at 39.
68. Id. at 41.-
69. Bujol v. Entergy Services, Inc., 833 So. 2d 947, 958 (La. App. 1st Cir.
2002). In its discussion of the duty/risk analysis the court stated:
The determination of liability under the duty/risk analysis usually requires
proof of five separate elements: (1) proof that the defendant's substandard
conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact
element); (2) proof that the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the
appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) proof that the defendant had
a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (4)
proof that the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the
plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and
(5) proof of actual damages (the damages element) (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 960. Although the topic is beyond the scope of this casenote, it is
nevertheless worth mentioning that the Restatement is a common law-based
doctrine that developed from the principle "that decisions of courts, being sources
of law, should be studied as data with the aim of deriving principles of law from
them and finally arranging them into a coherent system." John Henry Merryman,
The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe
and Latin America 66 (2d ed. 1999). Thus, the notion of adopting a common law-
created theory of recovery in a Civil Law jurisdiction such as Louisiana, just as the
First Circuit did in Bujol, is interesting to say the least.
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technical instruction document issued by ALSA, which set forth the
various safety policies that were supposed to be in effect at the time
of the plaintiff's accident. After examining some of the explicit
language of the technical instruction document, the court concluded
that the standards set forth were "requirements" that "must be
followed."'" And among these "requirements" was the stipulation
that the use of barrier walls was mandatory workplace procedure
applicable to all ALSA subsidiaries. In addition, the court relied
heavily upon an aspect of the record which indicated that "ALSA had
known for years prior to the fire at the Plaquemine plant that barrier
walls would have protected the workers [involved in the accident],
thus making the plaintiffs' injuries foreseeable."72 As a result, the
court affirmed the jury's conclusion that ALSA voluntarily assumed
a duty for the safety of the employees at the Plaquemine plant and
held that the duty requirement of the introductory portion of section
324A was satisfied.
The most interesting aspect of the court's decision is the lack of
attention the court gives to the subsections of 324A. In an attempt to
explain the proper procedure for applying 324A, the court quoted
entire portions of the Miller decision, but very little was offered by
the court to illustrate how ALSA's actions satisfied one of the three
subsections. Prior to presenting its analysis, the court simply stated:
"Having found support in the record for the jury's conclusion that
ALSA assumed a duty for safety at ALAC's Plaquemine plant, the
remainder of the inquiry required by section 324A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts is clearly satisfied by the evidence., 74 And
thereafter, the only evidence which received a significant amount of
commentary by the court was the testimony of three ALSA
employees.75 But from that testimony, not a single statement was
presented that manifested the notion that it was the primary
responsibility of ALSA, and not local management, to ensure that
work was being conducted in a safe environment at the Plaquemine
plant. However, the court quickly resolved this matter by adopting
the Miller court's argument, stating that
"[i]t would be inequitable to provide immunity to a parent
corporation that had assumed a duty of care to its subsidiary's
employees and whose unreasonable performance of its
undertaking was a cause of the injuries, simply because its
71. Bujol, 833 So. 2d at 963.
72. Id. at 964.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The court reviewed the testimonies of the safety director of AL World
Group, the director of the technical department at ALSA, and the head of ALSA's
engineering and construction activities. Id. at 963-4.
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activities were supplemental to, rather than in lieu of, the
subsidiary's practices. ' '76
Although the court mentioned, through a direct quote pulled from
the decision in Miller, that liability arises only when the actor fails to
exercise reasonable care and meets one of the requirements presented
in the subsections," it failed to explicitly state how ALSA's actions
fulfilled one of the three subsections. Without reference to subsection
(a), the court simply declared "that ALSA's failure to exercise
reasonable care increased the risk to third persons (in this case the
ALAC employees). 7 1 Unfortunately, the court did not provide any
further discussion explaining what ALSA did to increase the risk of
harm to the ALAC employees. The court could have provided its
readers with a better understanding of how it arrived at its ultimate
conclusion by presenting a semi-analogous case. Instead, many
questions were left unanswered. For instance, was there a change in
the conditions at the Plaquemine plant that increased the risk of harm
to the plaintiffs over the level of risk that existed before ALSA
allegedly became involved?79 Or did ALSA's inaction "occur in the
face of an increasing risk of harm?"8" Does this case signal that when
the First Circuit applies the Good Samaritan doctrine to cases in
similar situations plaintiffs will not be required to prove with
specificity how a defendant has either increased the risk of harm,
assumed the duty of another owed to a third person, or caused harm
to a third person because another individual relied upon the
defendant's undertaking to the third person's detriment?8' As the
Bujol opinion stands, it appears that the First Circuit would answer
this question in the affirmative.
IV. EFFECTS OF APPLYING THE GOOD SAMARITAN DOCTRINE IN
THE CORPORATE CONTEXT
A. Workers' Compensation Laws: What Exclusive Remedy?
The negative consequences that may result from courts applying
the Good Samaritan Doctrine in the corporate parent/subsidiary
context are numerous. Legally, a corporation and its various structural
manifestations enjoy the status of separate juridical entities for
76. Id. at 965 (quoting directly from Miller v. Bristol-Myers Co., 485 N.W. 2d
31, 39 (Wis. 1992).
77. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965).
78. Bujol, 833 So. 2d at 965..
79. See Canipe v. Nat'l Loss Control Serv. Corp., 736 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.
1984).
80. See Gaines v. Excel Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 569 (M.D. Tenn. 1987).
81. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965).
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purposes of limiting liability and many other benefits.82 Therefore,
when a court refuses "to give legal effect to the normally separate
legal personality of a corporation" the corporate veil is pierced and
notions of limited liability are swept under the rug for purposes of
adjudication. 3 However, some courts are rather reluctant to enage
in the practice of veil piercing. As Professor Glenn G. Morris has
noted, in Louisiana, "it is declared to be a strong public policy of [the
state] to favor the recognition of the corporation's separate existence,
so that veil-piercing is an extraordinary remedy, to be granted only
rarely. 85 However, by using the Good Samaritan doctrine to recover
damages from a parent corporation, the injured employee successfully
evades the challenge of forcing courts to consider whether to pierce
the corporate veil of a subsidiary, because such claims are deemed to
be "third party negligence actions brought directly against the ..
parent corporation based on [its] independent acts of negligence. ' 's6
Thus, the situation does not present itself in the context of a
traditional veil piercing case. As a result, when a parent corporation
attempts to defensively pierce the corporate veil of its subsidiary to
claim the benefits of the exclusive remedy provisions of a state's
workers' compensation statute, it is placed in a position that most
often does not lead to favorable results for the parent corporation.
This precarious position comes as a result of the fact that many courts
take "[tihe traditional and majority view .. that a corporation may
not disregard its own separate entity for any reason."87 Such
82. Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52 La. L. Rev.
271, 274-75 (1991).
The most commonly-recited reason for the recognition of the separate
identity of the corporation is the policy of providing limited liability to
corporate shareholders, officers and agents. Yet there are many other,
equally important objectives .... for example, the corporate personality
theory helps to simplify the ownership, management, and transfer of
property, the conduct of litigation, and the making and execution of
collective, usually majoritarian, decisions. Id.
83. Idat271.
84. Glenn G. Morris, Vice Chancellor and Class of 1950 Professor of Law,
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
85. Morris, supra note 82, at 282.
86. Andrew J. Natale, Comment, Expansion of Parent Corporation
Shareholder Liability Through the Good Samaritan Doctrine - 4 Parent
Corporation's Duty to Provide a Safe Workplace for Employees of Its Subsidiary,
57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 717, 734 n. 110 (1988) ("The good samaritan doctrine represents
one of several possible negligence theories that an injured employee could use to
recover against a parent corporate shareholder. The most important aspect of any
negligence claim brought against the parent is that the injured employee does not
have to pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary."(footnote omitted)).
87. Michael J. Gaertner, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should
Corporation Owners Have it Both Ways?, 30 Wn. & Mary L. Rev. 667,681 (1989).
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circumstances illustrate how injured workers employed by the
subsidiary of a large parent corporation may view the Good Samaritan
doctrine as the key to receiving a substantially greater return with
respect to compensatory damages as compared to taking the
traditional route of accepting only workers' compensation benefits for
their workplace injuries.88
When an employee is successful in bringing a suit against a parent
corporation under the Good Samaritan doctrine, one of the basic
principles of workers' compensation law is completely undermined.
As an illustration of the common theme reiterated in the
overwhelming majority of state workers' compensation statutes,
consider the principle underlying Louisiana's Workers'
Compensation Act. The' Louisiana workers' compensation system
embodies "a compromise in which the employer surrenders the
immunity against liability which he would otherwise enjoy in all
cases in which he was without fault, and, in return, the employee
loses his right to full damages for his injury ... ."" Parent
corporations most often will argue to be included in the list of parties
that are immune from tort liability for workplace injuries; however,
"courts have consistently denied parent corporations the immunity
granted through exclusive remedy provisions . . . ."" Thus, the
exclusive remedy provisions of a state's workers' compensation laws
are no more than mere words on paper for parent corporations being
sued by one of their subsidiaries' employees under the Good
Samaritan doctrine. And under such circumstances, "the [G]ood
[S]amaritan doctrine appears to represent little more than a 'back
alley' through which employees can attempt to circumvent the
worker's compensation system in hopes of trapping another deep
pocket in a third party negligence action."'
B. Liability for Attempting to Ensure a Safe Workplace
Disincentive
There is a simple solution for parent corporations wishing to
avoid liability for injuries that occur at their subsidiary's facilities,
and that is to have absolutely no interaction with their subsidiaries
88. See, e.g., Natale, supra note 86, at 736. ("By permitting injured employees
to use the good samaritan doctrine, the courts have essentially unlocked the back
door not only to the corporate law, but also to the state workers' compensation
systems.").
89. H. Alston Johnson III, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 361, in
14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (4t' ed. 2002).
90. N. Stevenson Jennette III, Providing Safety Services to Subsidiaries: A
Liability Trap for Parent Corporations, 1990 Det. C. L. Rev. 713, 714 (1990).
91. Natale, supra note 86, at 735 (footnote omitted).
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regarding workplace safety. For instance, parent corporations should
not disseminate any safety-related literature to their subsidiaries, such
as the technical instruction document discussed in Bujol. And
subsidiaries should operate their businesses with the understanding
that all safety matters, no matter how big or how small, are to be
addressed solely by local management. These tactics will likely
prevent parent corporation liability. However, this is not the kind of
conduct courts want to promote. But like it or not, if the Good
Samaritan doctrine continues to be viewed as such a lucrative
possibility for recovering damages above and beyond workers'
compensation, then corporations may start to seriously consider
taking such an isolated approach. Because sharing "with the
subsidiary any superior knowledge, technical expertise, or resources
it may possess" with regard to workplace safety may be too costly.
92
For example, in Bujol, ALSA would not have been liable for millions
of dollars had it simply chosen not to make an attempt to inform its
subsidiaries about the dangers of operating air separation facilities
without barrier walls. And furthermore, had this accident occurred
before ALSA purchased the Plaquemine plant in 1986, the plaintiffs
would have had almost no chance of recovering damages outside of
the exclusive benefits of workers' compensation, even though the
same conditions existed before ALSA became involved. There would
have been no one to blame for the absent barrier walls except the
direct employer, ALAC, which would undoubtably be immune from
tort liability. ALSA could have easily protected itself from massive
tort liability by simply scrapping the idea of providing valuable safety
information to its subsidiary plants.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE GOOD SAMARITAN DILEMMA
For employers throughout the state of Louisiana, the exclusive
remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act93 is an
invaluable resource for preventing injured workers from taking
tremendous swipes from their employer's finances. But for many
employees injured on the job, the provision is viewed as little more
92. Annette T. Crawley, Note, Environmental Auditing and the "Good
Samaritan "Doctrine: Implications for Parent Corporations, 28 Ga. L. Rev. 223,
266 (1993) (footnote omitted).
93. The exclusive remedy provision of La. R.S. 23:1032(A) (1998) provides:
[T]he rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on
account of an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is
entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other
rights and remedies . . . available to such employee, his personal
representatives, dependents, or relations, as against his employer, or any
principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such
employer or principal, for said injury, or compensable sickness or disease.
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than a burdensome obstacle standing in the way of allowing them to
receive adequate compensation, which has, in turn, resulted in a
continuous "assault on the exclusive remedy provision by plaintiffs'
attorneys. 94
In the past, the Louisiana Legislature has responded to this
"assault" by amending portions of the Workers' Compensation Act
with hopes of resolving some of the problems associated with
statutory interpretation. Prior to LSA-R.S. 23:1032's amendment in
1976, courts struggled to determine who was to be deemed an
"employer" for purposes of tort immunity under Section 1032.
Plaintiffs began alleging "that certain other employees of the same
employer (particularly executive officers charged with supervisory
and safety responsibilities) were negligent and hence liable in tort"
for their injuries. Courts eventually allowed these"executive officer"
suits to become a feasible method by which injured workers could
side-step the exclusive remedy provision of Section 1032."5 So "[t]o
prevent this circumvention of the basic compensation design, the
1976 legislature made compensation the exclusive remedy of the
employee against 'his employer, or any principal or any officer,
director, stockholder, partner, or employee.'"96
Once again, the exclusive remedy provision is under assault. If
the Good Samaritan doctrine continues to provide employees of
subsidiary corporations with a way to recover damages in suits
against parent corporations for workplace injuries, then the exclusive
remedy provision's intended effects may be substantially weakened
"[b]ecause such lawsuits defeat the purpose of workers compensation
statutes (to reduce lawsuits and ensure that workers are promptly
compensated for their injury)." '97 Therefore, it is once again time for
the Louisiana Legislature to evolve and keep pace with the growing
sophistication of the corporate world and its various operating
structures, not to mention the never-ending creativity of plaintiffs'
attorneys. Such a feat could be accomplished by a rather simple
amendment to the present workers' compensation statute. For example,
94. Treece & Zuckerman, A Parent Corporation's Liability for the Tort's of its
Subsidiary in the Context of the Exclusive Remedy Provision of the Workers'
Compensation Laws, 54 In. Couns. J. 609 (1983). The authors emphasize how "the
highly valued immunity protection afforded to an employer by carrying the workers'
compensation benefits insurance in compliance with the state statute is gradually
being eroded" by injured workers bringing third-party negligence actions against
the parent of a subsidiary corporation.
95. H. Alston Johnson III, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice § 361, in
14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (4'h ed. 2002).
96. Kathleen A. Manning, et al, The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the
1976 Regular Session, 37 La. L. Rev. 89, 183 (1976) (citing La. R.S. 23:1032
(1988), as amended by 1976 La. Acts 147, No. 147, § 1.
97. Jennette, supra note 90, at 714.
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inserting "or affiliate" in the exclusive remedy provision of LSA-R.S.
23:1032(A) would encompass all business entities which are members
of the same corporate family within the protective confines of the statute.
Thus, with the proposed addition, LSA-R.S. 23:1032(A) would provide:
[T]he rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his
dependent on account of an injury, or compensable sickness or
disease for which he is entitled to compensation under this
Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights, remedies...
available to such employee, his personal representatives,
dependents, or relations, as against his employer, or anyprincipal
or affiliate, or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or
employee of such employer or principal, for said injury, or
compensable sickness or disease."
By adding a few words to the list of entities which are declared
immune from suit by an injured employee, the legislature could
successfully bolster the effects of the exclusive remedy provision of
Louisiana's workers' compensation statute. In addition to providing
protection to parent corporations, similarly situated sister subsidiary
members of a common corporate structure would also be shielded from
suit by an injured worker attempting to impose liability under a single
business enterprise theory. Considering how the legislature took action
in 1976 "to eliminate the increasing number of employee actions in tort
against [executive officers and the like]," nothing should stop it from
seriously considering taking similar steps once again. Thus, it is
respectfully urged that the legislature make the necessary changes to
provide for parent corporations before suits against them become widely
known as the golden loophole of the exclusive remedy provision."
VI. CONCLUSION
When a tragic workplace accident occurs, the injured workers and
the families involved should not view such instances as something akin
98. La. R.S. 1032(A) (1998) (with emphasis added on proposed addition).
99. Michael Mossy Christovich, Workmen's Compensation - Retroactivity of
Amendment to Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Statute, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 907,
910 (1978); see also H. Alston Johnson III, Workers' Compensation Law and
Practice § 361, in 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (4t' ed. 2002) (referring to the
1976 amendment to the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Laws in that "the
primary purpose of the 1976 amendment to La. R.S. 23:1032 was to extend
specifically to executive officers of the employer the immunity previously enjoyed
by the employer under the section.").
100. See Natale, supra note 86, at 737 ("Perhaps the best way to protect the
parent from unlimited liability to a subsidiary's injured employees is to amend the
current workers' compensation statutes by adding a provision that extends immunity
to the parent corporation.").
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to a lottery, where the chances of being compensated for their losses is
not certain. Legislators nationwide realized this some time ago and that
is why states throughout the country have enacted workers'
compensation schemes, which guarantee "no questions asked"
compensation to the injured employee in return for the employer being
granted immunity from suit. But the Good Samaritan doctrine threatens
this very valuable system of compensation and immunity by defeating
the ultimate purpose behind workers' compensation statutes. In addition,
if parent corporations continue to be held liable for attempting to provide
a safe atmosphere in which the employees of their subsidiaries work, the
negative implications that may result (i.e., providing absolutely no help
in the area of increasing workplace safety) will undoubtably be out of
synch with desirable public policy. Therefore, it is time for a change. As
various business associations throughout the world continually change
the way in which they operate, many of them as a result of their ever-
increasing size, the state's workers' compensation statute must evolve to
accommodate this change and insure that the purpose and effect of
workers' compensation statutes are not completely eroded.
Matthew P. Bonham*
* Thank you to professor Frank L. Maraist for bringing this case to the
author's attention, and to Professor Glenn G. Morris, Shawn Carter, Whitney Elzen,
and Alexandra White for their valuable comments and suggestions provided during
the production of this casenote.
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